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Abstract: The Onondaga Nation of New York seeks to nullify a 
series of treaties executed by the State of New York, and thereby 
assert title to over 3100 square miles of land in Central New York 
State.   The goal of the suit is to enforce an environmental restoration 
of culturally and historically significant aboriginal lands.   In order to 
bring a claim against the State, the Nation must first compel the 
federal government to act on its behalf.  By  emphasizing distinctive 
features of Iroquois self-government, the following Note suggests 
ways to expand the federal government’s trust responsibility to 
protect cultural interests in land against state intrusion.   To do so, 
this Note explores the complex tension between Euro-American 
conceptions of governance and the Native American, particularly 
Iroquois, law of Gayanashogowa, or the Great Law of Peace.     
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INTRODUCTION 
In March of 2005, the Onondaga Nation, a member of the Six 
Nations Iroquois or Haudenosaunee Confederacy, filed a complaint 
in federal district court seeking legal recognition of its title to 3,100 
square miles of land in the State of New York.1   Like other Native 
American land claims before it, the Onondaga suit asserts that a 
series of treaties conveying land to the State of New York were 
unlawfully executed, and are therefore void.2  In order to redress 
over 200 years of spiritual, cultural and emotional harm, the 
Onondaga request a declaratory judgment stating that its members 
are the rightful owners of the lands at issue, which roughly center on 
the City of Syracuse.3  The Nation alleges that all treaties held by 
the State are in violation of the federal Indian Trade and Intercourse 
Act,4 the United States Constitution,5 the Treaty of Fort Stanwix,6 
and the Treaty of Canandaigua.7   Additionally, the Onondaga call for 
the federal government to file an identical suit against the State of 
New York, a duty which comports with the government’s trust 
obligation.8   
1 Complaint at 1-2,14,  Onondaga Nation v. New York, et al., (N.D.N.Y. March 11, 
2005); Indian Law Resource Center:  Onondaga Nation Land Claim 2005, 
http://www.indianlaw.org/onondaga.html.   
2 Indian Law Resource Center, supra note 1.   
3 Id.  
4 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1790).  
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
6 The Treaty of Fort Stanwix was signed in October of 1784.   Characterized as a 
inauspicious beginning to federal/tribal relations, the Treaty granted land cessions and six 
prisoners to the United States government following the Revolutionary War, in return for 
promises of peace and protection. Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Treaties: The 
History of a Political Anomaly 45-48 (University of California Press 1994).   
7 Complaint,supra note 1, at 13; Prucha, supra note 6, at 94-96.  This Note will not 
discuss the Treaty of Canandaigua nor the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (above).  Under 
Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960), the Supreme 
Court held that (1) both treaties only applied to reservation lands and (2) that the Treaty 
of Canandaigua only applied to federal relations with the Seneca Indians, the tribe who 
signed the treaty.  Similarly, the Supreme Court in Oneida Indian Nation v. County of 
Oneida, New York, 414 U.S. 661, found that the case did not rest on  treaty rights but 
rather the validity of land transfers to the State of New York. Prucha,supra note 6, at 392-
95.   
8 Complaint, supra note 1, at 4 (the United States has previously intervened or filed 
suits against the State of New York on behalf of the Seneca, Cayuga, Mohawk, and 
Oneida Nations).   
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Though the law suit is, in many respects, similar to other Native 
American land claims,9 the Onondaga’s pursuit of justice does not 
seek immediate monetary relief or gaming rights.10  Instead, the 
Nation raises concerns about environmental damage imposed on its 
ancestral land by current occupants.11  In doing so, the Onondaga 
contest the use of Western norms in evaluating the extent of harm it 
seeks to redress.12  Members of the Onondaga Nation claim that 
the environmental degradation caused by private parties has 
disrupted their cultural and spiritual connection to their native land, 
thereby interfering with their system of government. 13  As such, this 
law suit calls for a recognition of and respect for Native American 
conceptions of property and governancetraditions which have 
been disregarded in favor of Western theoretical and common-law 
constructions. 14     
 The Onondaga brings its claim as a plea for justice, seeking a 
declaration that its relationship with its native land “goes far beyond 
federal and state legal conceptions of ownership, possession, or 
other legal rights.”15 On one hand, this assertion suggests a 
necessary shift in our inquiry into Native American land claims: it 
asks us to examine, from an indigenous perspective, the true 
intentions of tribes regarding early federal land transactions.16  More 
importantly, the Onondaga suit serves as an opportunity to rethink 
what constitutes “justice” for Native American tribes seeking 
retribution for environmental harm to culturally significant lands.17    
 This Note contends that, after over 200 years of dispossession, 
“justice” may be achieved by first recognizing Native American 
conceptions of property, and then incorporating indigenous beliefs 
into the existing trust relationship between the federal government 
and Native American tribes.   As a historical/legal study, this Note 
explores the complex tension between two systems of property in 
 
9 The legal arguments made by the Onondaga mirror those made by the Oneida 
Nation in County of Oneida v. Oneida Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985).  See infra pp. 22-23.   
10 Kirk Semple, Tribe Lays Claim to 3,100 Square Miles of New York State, N.Y. 
TIMES Mar. 12, 2005, available at www.nytimes.com.   
11 See Complaint, supra note 1, at 1-3.  
12 See id. at 1-2. 
13 See id. at 1-6.  
14 See Complaint, supra note 1, at 1-2.   
15 Id.  
16 See id.  
17 See id. (“[T]he Onondaga people wish to bring about healing between themselves 
and all others who live in this region that has been the homeland of the Onondaga Nation 
since the dawn of time.”). 
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North America the Native American, namely  Iroquois, conception 
of Gayanashogowa and the American legal framework for property 
ownershipand the effect of this tension on federal-tribal relations.   
In doing so, this Note will highlight the role of the federal government 
in promoting a cross-cultural approach to Native American 
relationsa trust relationship directed towards protecting the 
realities and needs of its beneficiaries.   
 In order to provide context for examining these issues, Part I of 
this Note discusses elements of the Onondaga claim in detail: the 
significant parties involved, the cultural significance of the land at 
issue, and the legal arguments set forth by the Onondaga regarding 
each individual treaty executed by the State of New York.  Part II 
compares the Western “labor” justification for settlementa
background principle of property law set forth by John Lockewith 
the Iroquois conception of sovereignty and land use, codified in 
Gayanashogowa or the Great Law of Peace.  Part III examines the 
existing trust relationship between the federal government and 
Native American tribes, developed through both statutes and 
common law.   Part IV underscores the position the Onondaga 
Nation must take to expose the injustice caused by the treaties, and 
to enforce the federal government’s duty to act on the Nation’s 
behalf.    
 
I.   THE ONONDAGA LAND CLAIM  
A.  The Parties 
 
1.  The Onondaga Nation 
 
The Onondaga Nation is an officially recognized Indian tribe 
residing within a 7,300-acre reservation south of Nedrow, New 
York.18  The Nation brings its land claim under the authority of the 
Onondaga Council of Chiefs, discussed below as the Nation’s 
governing body.19 
 The Nation is a member of the Haudenosaunee (“People of the 
Longhouse”) Confederacy, known in English as the “Six Nations 
Iroquois Confederacy.”20   The Confederacy is an alliance of six 
 
18 Id.  
19 Id.  
20 Id. 
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individual nationsthe Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, 
Seneca, and Tuscarorawho are unified under a common traditional 
law called Gayanashogowa or the Great Law of Peace.21   Within 
this indigenous system of government, the Onondaga have 
maintained a status as the fire keeper, the spiritual center for the 
Haudenosaunee, for several centuries.22   Therefore, the Onondaga 
brings suit on its own behalf and on behalf of the Haudenosaunee 
Confederacy.23 
 
2.  Corporate Defendants 
 
a.  Honeywell International, Inc. 
 
Honeywell International, Inc. (“Honeywell”), a New Jersey 
corporation, owned industrial property along the southwest shore of 
Onondaga Lake from the 1880s until the 1980s.24   According to the 
Onondaga complaint, Honeywell and its predecessor companies 
contributed to the environmental degradation of the area by dumping 
mercury and other chemical contaminants into the Lake.25  Sources 
indicate that most of the lake’s pollution can be specifically attributed 
to the actions of Allied Chemical Corporation, which closed in 1986 
and merged with Honeywell in 1999.26   As such, Honeywell has 
been held legally responsible for almost all cleanup costs in the area, 
and is the main corporate defendant in this action.27   
 
b.  Clark Concrete Company, Inc. and Valley Realty Development 
Company 
Clark Concrete Company (“Clark”) and its affiliate, Valley Realty 
Development Company (“Valley Realty”) are Syracuse based 
 
21 Haudenosaunee Confederacy, Great Law of Peace, 
http://sixnations.buttnet.net/Great.Law.of.Peace/ 
22  Complaint,  supra note 1, at 3.   
23 Id.  
24 Complaint, supra note 1, at 5; William Kates, State Presents Final Lake Cleanup 
Plan, Tribe Calls it Inadequate, Associated Press, July 1, 2005, 
http://www.onondaganation.org/news.july05.html.   
25 Complaint, supra note 1, at 5; Kates, supra note 24 
26 Kates, supra note 24.  
27See id.  Honeywell is legally responsible for the clean up of Onondaga Lake 
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).   
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corporations occupying large portions of the land at issue.28  Clark 
operates the Tully gravel mine, which the Onondaga allege has both 
degraded the head waters of the Onondaga Creek and disrupted 
“areas of extreme archeological and cultural sensitivity.”29  The area 
where Clark began mining operations in 1997 is the site where 
wampum, discussed below as part of the Iroquois method of 
recording history, was first found.30 
 
c.  Trigen Syracuse Energy Corporation 
Trigen Syracuse Energy Corporation (“Trigen”) operates an 
energy “cogeneration” plant near Syracuse.31   The plant emits 
significant amounts of hydrochloric acids and dioxins while burning 
coal and plastic waste.32  The Onondaga include Trigen in its suit 
because of its role in the degradation of air quality throughout the 
region.33   
 
3.  Government Defendants 
 
Although the Onondaga Nation names both Onondaga County 
and the City of Syracuse as parties in their complaint, the principal 
government defendant in this case is the State of New York (“the 
State”).34   The State is the professed original “purchaser” of the 
subject land, having conducted numerous treaties with the 
Onondaga from the late eighteenth through early nineteenth 
centuries.35  The State has since conveyed the land to private 
parties, including the corporate defendants listed above.36   
 The State has the right to claim sovereign immunity against this 
action under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution.37  
Accordingly, the Onondaga request the State to waive its immunity 
 
28 Complaint,supra note 1, at 5.    
29 Id.  
30 Mike McAndrew, Onondagas File Huge Land Claim, The Post-Standard, Mar. 11, 
2005, available at www.syracuse.com.   
31 Complaint, supra note 1, at 6.  
32 Id.  
33 Complaint, supra note 1, at 6.   
34 See id. at 3-5.  
35 See id. at 7-10.   
36 Id. at 3-6.   
37 See U.S. Const. amend. XI.  Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 US 286 
(1942) 
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“in the interest of fairness toward the other defendants and in the 
interest of justice.”38  In the event that the State does not waive its 
immunity, the Onondaga also brought suit against Governor George 
Pataki, in his official capacity as the Governor of New York and in his 
individual capacity, alleging that he is acting beyond the scope of his 
authority by claiming an interest in the land.39  Most importantly, the 
Onondaga request the United States government to file an identical 
suit against the State as a trustee/fiduciary to the Nation.40  If the 
United States acts on behalf of the Onondaga, its suit will bypass any 
sovereign immunity asserted by the State.41   
 
B.  The Land and the Lake 
 
Until 1788, the Onondaga held a forty-mile wide slice of New 
York State.42  According to its claim, the Onondaga’s aboriginal land 
extends south from Canada to the Pennsylvania border, and east 
from the St. Lawrence River to Lake Ontariosituated between the 
native land of the Cayuga to the west and the Oneida to the east.43  
This area includes most of present day Jefferson, Oswego, 
Onondaga, and Cortland counties, encompassing approximately -
3100 square miles.44   Today, the Nation resides on only  eleven 
square miles of land, with nearly 875,000 non-Indian residents 
occupying former Onondaga territory.45      
 Though all of the land at issue is of vital importance to the 
Onondaga, its claim focuses on the environmental degradation of 
Onondaga Lake.46  Accordingly, this section focuses on the 
Onondaga’s deep cultural connection to the Lake, and the Lake’s 
current condition.   
 
1.  The History of Onondaga Lake 
 
38 Complaint, supra note 1, at 4.   
39 Id.  
40 Indian Law Resource Center, supra note 1.   
41 Complaint, supra note 1, at 4.   
42 The Post Standard, How the Onondaga Territory Shrank Mar. 11, 2005, available 
at http://www.syracuse.com/printer/printer.ssf?/news/indianlandclaims/story5.html. 
43 Id.; Complaint, supra note 1, at 6-7.  
44 Complaint, supra note 1, app. at 15; Semple, supra note 1.  
45 McAndrew, supra note 30.  
46  See Indian Law Resource Center, supra note 1.  
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Historians trace human settlement of Onondaga Lake as far 
back as 8000 BC,  when the retreat of glaciers opened up large 
areas of inhabitable land around present day Central New York.47  
Until its acquisition by the State of New York in 1795, the Lake and 
the hills surrounding it served as the cultural and economic center of 
the Onondaga Nation.48  As an essential transportation and 
communication route, the Lake and its tributaries connected the 
Onondaga to other native communities.49  These interactions 
compelled five separate nations from the area to unite on the Lake’s 
shores several hundred years ago to form the Haudenosaunee 
Confederacy.50   As Chief Sid Hill of the Onondaga Nation stated in 
2004:  
 
The Onondaga Nation. . . is connected to this body of water  by 
 ties that transcend time and space.  Our ancestors walked the paths 
 around Onondaga Lake.  They hunted, fished, and paddled across its 
 once-blue waters.  Most certainly, they stopped on the shores  to 
give  thanks for all that  the Creator had given them.51     
 
In addition to its strong historical significance, the Lake is often 
characterized as the lifeblood of Iroquois, particularly  Onondaga, 
civilization.52  Prior to European settlement, the Lake had an 
unusually  vast growth of algae and was thus capable of  supporting 
a cold water fishery habitat.53  An extensive supply of fresh fish 
sustained the Onondaga for several centuries.54   
 
2.  The Settlement and Environmental Degradation of Onondaga 
Lake 
 
47 Onondaga Lake Partnership, Lake Area Settlement & Development, 
http://www.onlakepartners.org/p1102.html.   
48 See id.  
49 Id.  
50 See McAndrew, supra note 30.   In an interview, Chief Sid Hill, referring to the 
Lake, stated, “That’s our cathedral, right there.”  Id. 
51 Sid Hill, Letter to the Editor,  Post Standard Dec. 4, 2004, available at 
http://www.onondaganation.org/news.sid12405.html.  
52 See id.  
53 See id.  
54 Upstate Freshwater Institute (UFI),  Onondaga Lake, 
http://www.upstatefreshwater.org/html/onondaga_lake.hrml.   
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In 1654,  the Onondaga Nation revealed the existence of salt 
springs within the Lake to French settlers.55  Settlement increased 
in the eighteenth century, as Jesuit missionaries, trappers, and 
traders began following French explorers into the area.56  The 
completion of the Erie Canal in the early 1800s fully opened Central 
New York State to new settlement, and a booming salt industry.57    
 The industrial revolution brought various chemical operations to 
the Onondaga Lake area, including Allied Chemical, now known as 
Allied Signal, Inc.58  The State first interfered with the Lake’s natural 
ecosystem in 1822, when it dredged the outlet of the Lake to lower 
the water level and drain wetlands.59   The dredged area has since 
become lower downtown Syracuse.60   
 As a result of over 100 years of chemical dumping by industries 
such as Allied, Onondaga Lake is now considered to be the most 
polluted lake in the United States.61  With its ecosystem completely 
disrupted, the Lake has an excessive growth of algae, making the 
water unviable as an economic resource.62  Swimming in the Lake 
was banned in 1940 and fishing in 1970.63  A combination of 
industrial and municipal waste, mainly from sewage and mercury, 
has caused a significant decrease to the Lake’s value as a 
recreational area.64  Under state regulations, New York filed a 
national resources damages claim in 1989 against Honeywell.65  
Five years later, the Lake was listed as a Superfund site under the 
federal Resource Conservation Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA).66    
 
C.  The Treaties 
 
The Onondaga allege that five treaties conveying aboriginal land 
to the State of New York were illegally executed and are therefore 
void.67  Each treaty is briefly discussed below and identified by date.   
 
55 Onondaga Lake Partnership, supra note 47.   
56 Id.  
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id.  
60OnondagaLake, supra note 47.   
61 UFI, supra note 54.  
62 Id. 
63 Id.  
64 Onondaga Lake, supra note 47.  
65 Id.
66 Id.  
67 The Post-Standard, supra note 42.  
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1.  1788 
 
In 1788 the Onondaga Nation conveyed two million acres of 
aboriginal territory to the State of New York.68  In addition, the treaty  
established that Onondaga Lake and its surrounding areas would be 
held for the shared benefit of the State and the Onondaga for the 
exclusive purpose of making salt.69  The State, in return for the 
agreement, paid the Nation $1000 French crowns and 200 pounds of 
clothing, with an additional promise to make payments of $500 per 
year.70   
 Through this treaty, the Onondaga lost all but 108 square miles 
of its aboriginal land.71  The treaty came about when New York’s 
then governor, George Clinton, told the Onondaga that white settlers 
would steal its land without granting compensation.72  In response to 
the apparent threat, two members of the Nation, Kahikton and 
Tehonwaghsloweaghte, negotiated with the State.73  The Onondaga 
claim that these two individuals were not chiefs, and therefore did 
not have the authority to settle treaties on behalf of the Nation. 74  
 Following protests made by the Onondaga Council of Chiefs, the 
State met with the Onondaga in the Spring of 1790 to ratify and 
confirm the 1788 treaty. 75  The treaty was ratified on June 16, 1790, 
only one month prior to the passing of the federal Indian Trade and 
Intercourse Actdiscussed below as the legislation which prohibited 
states from conducting land dealings with Native American tribes 
without congressional approval.76 
Though the treaty was signed prior  to the passing of the Trade 
and Intercourse Act, the Onondaga argue that under a New York 
State real property law the treaty was legally ineffective until its date 
of recording November 25, 1791.77  Therefore, the Onondaga’s 
 
68 Id.  
69 Id. 
70 Id.  
71 Id.  
72 The Post Standard, supra note 43.  
73 Id.  
74 Id. 
75 Complaint, supra note 1, at 8-9. 
76 Id. 25 U.S.C.. § 177 was passed on July 22, 1790.  Id. at 8.    
77 See id. at 9.  
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claim to over half of the disputed land rests on a contingency that the 
court will apply the New York State recording statute.78    
 
2.  1793 
 
In a 1793 treaty the State purchased about seventy-nine square 
miles of territorywhich is now comprised of Syracuse and its 
surrounding suburbsfor a total payment of $410.79   In order to 
circumvent the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, the State 
Surveyor General Simeon DeWitt and Senator John Cantine assured 
the Onondaga that the State intended to lease, rather than buy, its 
land.80  The treaty itself states that New York is the new owner of 
the land, though Congress never approved of the sale as required by 
the Act.81    Accordingly, the court will determine the legitimacy of 
this treaty under the factors used to determine a Trade and 
Intercourse Act violation.82   
 
3.  1795 
 
The Onondaga lost all rights to Onondaga Lake in a 1795 treaty 
with the State.83   In direct violation of the Trade and Intercourse Act, 
the State purportedly bought the rights to Onondaga Lake and the 
mile around it for $500 and 100 bushels of salt per year.84  Although 
U.S. Attorney General William Bradford notified Governor Clinton 
that the State could not buy land unless the treaty was approved by 
Congress, Clinton followed through with the sale.85  He later gifted 
the three Onondagas who signed the treaty one square mile each.86 
 
d.  1817 and 1822 
 
The formation of these two treaties involved the participation of 
Ephraim Webster, an interpreter secured by the State and the first 
 
78 See id. The elements needed for establishing a Trade and Intercourse Act 
violation are listed in Part III below.   
79 The Post Standard, supra note 43.  
80 Id.  
81 Id. 
82 See id.  
83 Id.  
84 The Post Standard, supra note 43.  
85 Id.  
86 Id.  
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white settler of Syracuse.87  Although the Onondaga accused 
Webster of betraying their trust through intentional misinterpretation, 
they nonetheless lost a total of 4,893 acres of reservation territory 
through these two treaties.88 Both treaties were never approved by 
Congress, and will therefore be scrutinized by the court as potential 
violations of the Trade and Intercourse Act.89   
 
D.  The Remedy 
 
If this suit prevails, the Onondaga Nation does not intend to 
evict business and homeowners from the land.90  Nor do they plan 
to collect rents or operate gaming facilities.91  Rather, the Nation’s 
members hope to use a declaratory judgment in their favor to force 
the State to restore their indigenous territory to its original 
condition.92    In recent years, the Onondaga has shown its 
sensitivity towards non-Indian neighbors residing in its aboriginal 
territory by collaborating with both rural and urban community 
organizations engaged in environmental cleanup.93  As Sid Hill 
stated in a 2005 interview, “We’re trying to do a different land-rights 
action here¼.Our concern is the environment and how we as two 
peoples can live in the area that was our ancestors.”94  As such, this 
claim arises solely out of the Onondaga’s desire to have some 
control over the well-being of its aboriginal land.95      
 The restoration of Onondaga Lake is the central focus of this 
law suit.96  Under New York State’s current cleanup plan, Honeywell 
will spend $451 million over the course of seven years to dredge 
2.65 million yards of contaminated sediment from the bottom of the 
Lake.97  In addition, the plan calls for a cap made of sand, gravel, 
and other material to be placed over the remaining 579 acres.98  
Honeywell has proposed a less expensive and extensive cleanup 
 
87 Id.  
88 Id.  
89 See id.  
90 McAndrew, supra note 30, at 1-2.  
91 Id.  
92 Complaint, supra note 1, at 1-2; id. 
93 Onondaga Nation, The Onondaga Nation and Environmental Stewardship, 
http://www.onondaganation.org/media.environment.html.  
94 McAndrew, supra note 30.  
95 See id.  
96 See Kates, supra note 24.  
97 Id.  
98 Id. 
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plan: a $237 million dollar, three year plan to dredge 508, 000 cubic 
yards and cap the remaining 350 acres.99   The Onondaga, on the 
other hand, call for an extremely thorough cleanup.100   For their 
plan, they  demand nearly 22 million cubic yards of sediment 
dredged with a cap over the entire lake bottom of 2329 acres.101  
The Onondaga plan will cost $2.3 billion and will take seventeen 
years to complete.102  
 By making environmental cleanup the cornerstone of this 
lawsuit, the Onondaga emphasizes its strong historic connection to 
the land at issuea relationship which, it believes, trumps any 
concern over money.103   Therefore, this suit is, above all, an effort 
to hold the State of the New York and private corporations fully 
accountable for disrupting and disrespecting the Onondaga’s 
centuries old existence. 104  The theory used to justify this 
(mis)treatment is discussed in the following section.   
 
II.  CONFLICTING CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY 
In the Two Treatises of Government, John Locke constructed 
the formative assumptions used by European settlers to justify the 
acquisition of property rights over Native American land.105    As 
James Tully, the author of “Aboriginal Property and Western Theory,” 
states, it is Locke’s principle assumptions which “conjoin to 
misrecognize two conditions of [Native American] peoples at the time 
of European arrival and settlement: their systems of property and 
their political organizations.”106 Despite Locke’s fundamental 
misrecognition, his assumptions regarding Native American political 
and economic “underdevelopment” formed the basis for Western 
constructions of control and ownership.107   This section first 
examines Locke’s prevailing theory of private property rights and 
 
99 Id.  
100 Id.  
101 Kates, supra note 24. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id.  
105  James Tully, Aboriginal Property and Western Theory:  Recovering a Middle 
Ground, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY & POLICY, 158-59 (1994) (discussing JOHN LOCKE, TWO 
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 14, 30, 49, 108, 109 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
University Press, 1970).   
106 Tully, supra note105 , at 158.   
107 See id. at 164-67.   
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Western attitudes towards Native American societies, and then 
distinguishes key European assumptions from existing Native 
American conceptions of property.   
 
A. The Western Notion of Property:  Locke’s Labor Justification 
 
Locke’s theory, as articulated in the Second Treatise, rests on 
the belief that Native Americans were in a pre-political “state of 
nature” phase of historical and political development, a phase which 
European societies had long surpassed.108  As Locke stated, “[I]n 
the beginning, all the World was America”109with no system of 
government nor propertyand, since then, Europeans developed 
complex legal systems governing land ownership and commercial 
agriculture.110    
 From this belief, Locke came to the widely accepted conclusion 
that Europeans could settle and acquire private property rights to 
“vacant” land through means of laboras defined by European 
norms of agriculture and mercantilism.111   Under Locke’s view, the 
primary reason for the so-called underdevelopment of Native 
American peoples was their limited use for property, demonstrated 
by their inclination towards hunting and gathering rather than 
cultivation and commercial sale.112   Since Native American 
communities did not use land to produce surplus, Locke conceived 
that their property rights rest in the products of their laborthe fish 
that they catch, the deer that they hunt, the food that they 
gatherrather than in the land itself.113   
 With an understanding that the European system of surplus was 
far superior to the Native American system of subsistence hunting 
and gathering, Locke claimed that settlement and exercise of 
dominion over Native American lands served both societies by: (1) 
using the land more efficiently, (2) producing a greater number of 
amenities, and (3) creating more work through a division of labor.114  
Accordingly, Locke’s arguments were used by theorists throughout 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to defend European 
 
108Id. at 159.   
109 Tully, supra note 105, at 159 (quoting Locke, supra note 105, § 49).    
110 Tully, supra note 105,  at 159.   
111 Id.   
112 Id.  
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 160 (citing Locke, supra note 105, at §§ 37, 40-43, 48-49).  
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settlement and the dispossession of Native American lands.115  For 
example, Emeric de Vattel, in The Law of Nations or Principles of 
Natural Law, wrote:  
 
Every Nation is therefore bound by the law of nature to cultivate 
that land which has fallen to its share.   There are others who, in 
order to avoid labour, seek to live upon their flocks and the fruits of 
the chase.  Now that the human race has multiplied so greatly, it 
could not subsist if every people wished to live after that fashion.  
Those who still pursue this idle mode of life occupy more land than 
they would have need of under a system of honest labour, and they 
may not complain if other more industrious nations, too confined at 
home, should come and occupy part of their lands.116   
 
de Vattel, like other theorists following Locke’s arguments, 
perpetuated a misunderstanding that settlers were entitled to Native 
American lands.117  
 Locke’s foundational assumptions regarding European rights 
over Native American lands bypasses a basic principle of Western 
law: the requirement of consent in the formation of contracts.118   
The labor justification may have played a part in the Onondaga case 
because, as discussed below, the tribe was dispossessed of its land 
without any clear indication of mutual assent or even knowledge.119    
Since the federal government’s fiduciary duty, discussed in Part II, 
ensures that Native American tribes are contracted with equitably,  
the State’s disregard for mutual assent therefore imposes a strong 
obligation upon the federal government to intervene on the 
Onondaga’s behalf.120    
 
B.  Gayanashogowa:  The Great Law of Peace and Native American 
Conceptions of Property 
 
115 See id.  
116 Tully,  supra note 105, at 165 (discussing Emeric de Vattel, Le droit des gens, ou 
principle de la loi naturelle (1758) reprinted The Law of Nations or the Principles of 
Natural Law 207-10, (Charles G. Fenwick trans. Carnegie Institute, 1902). Ironically, the 
Onondaga refers to their own system of property ownership and use as “Natural Law.”   
The Honorable Oren Lyons, Chief, Onondaga Nation, Sovereignty and Sacred Land in 13 
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 19, 20 (Fall 2000). 
117 Tully, supra note 105 , at 159.   
118 Id. at 160 (discussing quod omnes tangit ab omnibus tractari et approbari debet 
(“what touches all must be agreed upon by all.”).    
119 See id.  
120 See infra text accompanying notes 213-16.  
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Despite Locke’s contention that Native American societies were 
in a pre-political, “underdeveloped” state, historical evidence 
indicates that a highly developed, complex, and vibrant system of 
governance and property ownership existed among Iroquois tribes 
prior to European arrival.121  A typical form of Iroquois government 
was a nation led by a longhouse, or council, of chiefs taken from 
familial clans.122  Each nation was comprised of several governing 
elements: “clearly demarcated and defended territory, a decision-
making body, a consensus-based decision-making procedure, and a 
system of customary laws and kinship relations.”123  Though nations 
did not have standing armies, bureaucracy, or police, individual 
nations engaged in trade, diplomacy, and war as distinct, self-
governing entities.124   When the Haudenosaunee confederacy was 
formed, five individual Iroquois nations joined to form one union, 
governed by the Grand Council of Chiefs.125    
 The central feature of Iroquois governance among nations was 
Gayanashogowa, or the Great Law of Peace, the oldest living 
constitution in North America and the founding constitution of the 
Haudenosaunee confederacy.126   At its core, Gayanashogowa 
defines the functions of the Grand Council of Chiefs and dictates 
how the six nations resolve conflicts among one another.127  
Though Gayanashogowa is an oral tradition, it has been recorded 
and translated several times.128  These written accounts describe 
strong cultural metaphors associated with the land:   
 
The Peacemaker established the symbols of the Great Law.  
 The  Longhouse has five fireplaces but one family . . . .The  Tree of 
 
121 See id. at 177.  
122 Tully, supra note 105, at 163; WILLIAM N. FENTON, THE GREAT LAW AND THE 
LONGHOUSE: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE IROQUOIS CONFEDERACY 7 (University of 
Oklahoma Press 1998); See also Arthur C. Parker, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FIVE 
NATIONS, OR THE IROQUOIS BOOK OF THE GREAT LAW, in PARKER ON THE IROQUOIS 41 
(William N. Fenton ed., Syracuse University Press, 1968) (Parker published a written 
account of Gayanashogowa, stating that “The War Chiefs shall be selected from the 
eligible sons of the female families holding the head Lordship titles.” 
123 See id.  
124 Tully, supra note 105, at 163.  
125 The Haudenosaunee Confederacy, The Great Law of Peace: What are the 
values and traditions of the Founding Constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy? 1, 
http://sixnations.buttnet.net/Great_Law_of_Peace.   The Tuscarora Nation joined the 
Haudenosaunee Confederacy from the South in 1712.  Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.   
126 Haudenosaunee, supra note 125, at 1.  See The Constitution of the Five 
Nations, supra note 122, at 7-13.   
127 Id.  
128 Id.  
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Peace was  planted in the center of the circle of  chiefs.   An 
eagle  was  placed on top to watch out for enemies.  The White  Roots of 
 Peace  stretched out across the  land . . . . The meal of  beaver tail 
 was  shared . . . . These are all symbols of power that  comes 
from the  unity of  peace.129 
 
The Peacemaker, who constructed Gayanashogowa, instructed each 
individual and nation to make decisions on behalf of the seventh 
generation to comea notion embedded in the Haudenosaunee and 
Onondaga worldview.130 Thus, under the principles of “good word, 
peace, and power” the Onondaga maintained sovereignty over their 
lands throughout several centuries.131    
 
1.  Native American Traditions of Land Ownership 
 
Unlike Western societies, the Haudenosaunee believed in 
collective, common ownership of real property among members of 
the Confederacy.132  Though the territory of each nation became 
Haudenosaunee land, individual nations maintained a special 
interest in their historic territory and ultimate title rested in female 
members of each nation.133 Jurisdiction over the land was held in 
trust by a Council, comprised of two types of chiefs: (1) war chiefs, 
who dealt with the other nations under Gayanashogowa, and (2) 
peace chiefs, who dealt mainly with civil affairs.134  The primary 
responsibility of the Council of Chiefs, as protectors of the land, 
rested in maintaining the nation’s territorial sovereignty.135    
 In most respects, the identity of a nation as a distinct people was 
indivisible from its historical relationship to the land in all of its uses, 
 
129 Id.  
130 Oren Lyons, Council of Chiefs Onondaga Nation,Letter to Editor, Post-Standard, 
http://www.onondaganation.org/news.oct1705.html.   
131 See id. As Syracuse religion professor Phil Arnold recently stated, "Only three 
Indian nations [in the US] are still governed by sacred means. Onondaga is one of them.”  
Charles J. Reith, First Onondaga Land Rights Action Talk Gathers a Crowd, 
http://www.peacecouncil.net/NOON/commonfuture/media/NationMidstRept.html.  
Complaint, supra note 1, at 1-2 (stating “[T]he Nation and its people have a unique 
spiritual, cultural, and historic relationship with the land, which is embodied in 
Gayanashogowa, the Great Law of Peace.”). 
132 Fenton, supra note 122, at 7. 
133 Haudenosaunee Confederacy, Grand Council: What are the Land Rights of the 
Haudenosaunee? (Aug. 1981), 
http://sixnations.buttnet.net/Grand_Council/?article=land_rights;  Fenton, supra note 122, 
at 7. 
134 Fenton, supra note 122, at 7.  
135 See id.  
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its domestic animals, its ecology, and the spirits that share the land 
with living beings.136  A common spiritual conception was that the 
earth, particularly the North American continent, is a great turtle, with 
all of life’s necessities on its back.137  With this strong identification 
with the land came rights and responsibilities, which were conveyed 
through matrilineal ties and oral traditions.138   Though this “bundle 
of rights” scheme initially appears similar to Western conceptions of 
property ownership, its distinctive feature was an understanding that 
property rights relate to forms of activity on the land, rather than the 
material products of such activities or the monetary value of the land 
itself.139     
 As such, there was no right of sale within the Haudenosaunee 
conception of property.140  The confederacy may convey a right of 
co-useto temporarily join in its existence and relationship to the 
land.141  However, as the Haudenosaunee Grand Council states, 
“This land, the Turtle Island, was created for all to use forever - not to 
be merely exploited for this present generation.  In no event is land 
for sale.”142 
2.  Kahswentha, The Two Row Wampum 
 
From 1645 to 1815,  the Haudenosaunee conducted international-
style dealings called Kahswentha, or Two Row Wampum 
Treaties.143  The treaties involved the gifting of wampum 
beltsused to visually represent relations among Native American 
nations and outside partiesto Europeans.144  The wampum belt 
now serves as an historical artifact,  signifying the true understanding 
 
136 Tully, supra note 105, at 164.   As discussed above, every aspect of the 
indigenous land held a distinct place within the Iroquois constitution.   Therefore, each 
nation’s identity was linked to its existence with nature.  This principal, embodied in 
Gayanashogowa, indicates that the balance between mankind and nature is crucial to 
Iroquois self-governance.   
137 Haudenosaunee Confederacy, supra note 133.  
138 See Fenton, supra note 122, at 27, 129; Tully, supra note 105, at 164.  
139 Fenton, supra note 122, at 113-14; Tully, supra note 105, at 164.   .  
140 Haudenosaunee Confederacy, supra note 133.  
141 The text of Gayanashogowa provides for the temporary sharing of lands.    The 
Constitution of the Five Nations,supra note 122, at 51. 
142 Haudenosaunee Confederacy, supra note 133. 
143 See generally RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND 
REPUBLICS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION, 1650-1815, 305-17 (Cambridge University Press 
1991)(discussing early treaty relations).    
144 Tully, supra note 105, at 177. 
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of Native American, particularly Iroquois, nations concerning 
negotiations and transactions.145    
 The three visual components of a wampum belt represent an 
approach which differs greatly from those set forth by Locke and 
other European theorists.  A white background symbolizes the purity 
of an agreement,146 two parallel rows of purple beads symbolize the 
autonomy of native and non-native parties taking part in the 
negotiation, and three individual beads set between the two rows 
symbolize peace, friendship, and respect.147   In a presentation 
made to the Canadian House of Commons Committee on Indian 
Self-Government in 1983, the Haudenosaunee Confederacy clarified 
the meaning of the two parallel rows:  
 
[The beads] symbolize two paths or two vessels, traveling down the 
same rivers together.  One, a birch bark canoe, will be for the Indian 
people, their laws, their customs, and their ways.  The other, a ship, 
will be for the white people and their laws, their customs, and their 
ways.  We shall each travel the river together, side by side, but in 
our own boat.  Neither of use will try to steer the other’s vessel.148   
This view is consistent with the text of Gayanashogowa, which states 
that “[a foreign nation] must never try to control, to interfere with or to 
injure the Five Nations nor disregard the Great Peace or any of its 
rules or customs . . . Then should the adopted nation disregard these 
injunctions, their adoption shall be annulled and they shall be 
expelled.”149  As demonstrated by these historical records, the 
Haudenosaunee viewed its political systembased on spiritual and 
 
145 Id.  
146 Id. 
147 See id.; Parker, supra note 122, at 51. 
148 Tully, supra note 105, at 177 (quoting Haudenosaunee Confederacy,  
Presentation to the House of Commons Committee on Indian Self-Government (1983), 
reprinted by Michael Mitchell, An Unbroken Assertion of Sovereignty, in DRUMBEAT:
ANGER AND RENEWAL IN INDIAN COUNTRY 109-10, Boyce Richardson, ed., (Summerhill 
Press-The Assembly of First Nations 1989)).   
149 This portion of the text refers to the Haudenosaunee’s temporary adoption of 
foreign nations.  Gayanashogowa commands the War Chiefs to carry out an expulsion by 
stating:  
 Now the Lords of the Five Nations have decided to expel you and cast you out.  
 We disown you now and annul your adoption.  Therefore you must look  
 for a path in caused this sentence of annulment. So then go your way and  
 depart from the territory of the Five Nations and from the Confederacy.”  
 Parker, supra note 122, at 51. 
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ancestral rather than commercial ties to landas everlasting and 
dominant.150   
 
III.  The Trust Relationship  
 
The relationship between Native American tribes and the 
federal government is predicated upon a principle that “powers which 
are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are . . . inherent [residual] 
powers of limited sovereignty which [have] never been 
extinguished.”151  Within the realm of “limited sovereignty” retained 
by tribes exists the right of self-government, defined by Felix Cohen 
as “the power of an Indian tribe to adopt and operate under a form of 
government of the Indians’ choosing.”152  The trust relationship 
therefore adheres to a basic tenet of the theory of conquest: “[i]t is 
only by positive enactments, even in the case of conquered and 
subdued nations, that their laws [are] changed by the conqueror.”153   
 Though tribes hold the power of self-government, their status as 
“conquered,” dependant entities places them under the protection of 
the United States government.154  Accordingly, the trust relationship 
includes a series of moral and legal obligations and expectancies, 
the most important being a legal fiduciary duty on the part of the 
Executive Branch.155   The fiduciary duty obligates the federal 
 
150 See id.  
151 Felix Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 122 (1988).   
152 Cohen explains that within the complex and largely undefined relationship 
between tribes and the federal government, self-government is the most significant 
remnant of Native American sovereignty “the Indian’s last defense against 
administrative oppression.”  Other elements of tribal self-government include “the power 
to define conditions of tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations of members, to 
prescribe rules of inheritance, to levy taxes, to regulate property within the jurisdiction of 
the tribe, to control the conduct of members by municipal legislation, and to administer 
justice.”Id.  153 Id.  
154 Id. at 116; United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-85 (1886) (stating
 “They [Indian tribes] are dependant on the United States. . . Dependent for their 
 political rights. . . From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the 
course  of dealing of the Federal Government with them, and the treaties in which it has 
been  promised, there arises the duty of protection. . . . ”).    
155 See id. at 123. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), located within the Department 
of Interior, is the administrative agency responsible for the fulfillment of the federal trust 
relationship.  Unfortunately, threats against Indians often come from other agencies 
within the Department of Interior and their constituents.  As such, the Bureau has been 
criticized on various counts by tribes who believe the Bureau favors non-Indian over 
Indian interests.  The Supreme Court has ruled that the interests of federal agencies 
must supersede those of Indian tribes.  See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 127 
(1983) (stating that the Bureau’s obligation to its other beneficiaries excuses the 
government from following “the fastidious standards of a private fiduciary.”); Scholder v. 
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government to act on behalf of Indian tribes to protect the tribes’ 
inherent, residual sovereignty against intrusions by states and 
private parties.156    As a necessary element of the fiduciary duty, 
the federal government must act as an intermediary between states 
and Native American tribes, ensuring the best interests of the Indian 
in all circumstances.157  The trust relationship therefore serves as a 
shield “to protect tribes from the ever-encroaching fangs of the 
states”158a protection which Congress alone has the authority to 
sever.159    
 The nature of the federal-tribal relationship raises a key issue in 
the case of the Onondaga because the Nation’s right to be governed 
under Gayanashogowa comports with its right to self-
government.160       Any infringement upon the Onondaga’s form of 
governance by the State triggers a duty on the part of federal 
government to intervene.161  As such, the Onondaga must establish 
that unlawful dealings by the State of New York directly imposed 
upon the tribe’s ability to follow Gayanashogowa.162 
 This section explores the statutory and common law 
constructions of the trust relationship, underscoring the fiduciary 
responsibilities of the federal government with regards to tribal/state 
relations.163   Because the scope and reach of the trust relationship 
is largely undefined, the information presented below signals an 
 
United States, 428 F.2d 1123, 1130 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970)(involving 
the Bureau’s failure to provide irrigation for Indian residents, despite providing for non-
Indians.).    
156 Cohen, supra note 151, at 123.   
157 See id.  
158 Peter D. Lepsch, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Is New York State’s Move to 
Cleanup the Akwesasne Reservation an Endeavor to Assert Authority Over Indian 
Tribes?, 8 ALB.L.ENVTL.OUT.J 65, 85(2002).   Kagama, 118 U.S. 383 (“[b]ecause of the 
local ill feeling, the people of the States where they [Native tribes] are found are often 
their deadliest enemies.”).   
159 Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d at 380 (denying 
state’s claim that the tribe is precluded by acquiescence from asserting a trust 
relationship and stating that “once Congress has established a trust relationship with an 
Indian tribe, Congress alone has the right to determine when its guardianship shall 
cease”).   
160 Cohen, supra note 151, at 122-23.  
161 See id.  
162 See id.  
163 Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 558 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1,16 (1831); Passamaquoddy, 528 F.2d 370(1975). 
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opportunity for litigants like the Onondaga to craft boundaries which 
protect a broader range of native interests.164   
 
A.  Constitutional Origins of the Trust Relationship 
 
The textual origins of the federal-tribal relationship derive from 
the United States Constitution.165  Immediately after the American 
Revolution, the Articles of Confederation, quite vaguely, declared 
that:  
 
The United States in Congress assembled shall also have the  
 sole and exclusive right and power of. . . regulating the   
 trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members 
 of the any of the States within its own limits be not in  
fringed or violated. 166 
 
With the adoption of the new Constitution, the general trend 
towards increasing federal authority extended to Indian affairs.167  
Therefore Article I, section 8, clause 3 (the Indian Commerce 
Clause) granted Congress the broad authority “[t]o regulate 
commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes.”168 This clause, in conjunction with the 
Supremacy Clause, creates a grant of power to Congress for 
legislation dealing with Native American tribes.169  The authority 
bestowed upon the federal government by the Constitution 
established a federal-tribal relationship, which would evolve into a 
trust relationship under the Marshall decisions discussed below .170   
 
B.   The Indian Trade and Intercourse Act 
 
164 See Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty:  A 
New Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 
UTAH L. REV. 109, 122-23.   
165 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (excluding the state 
from conducting trade and limiting the right to tax on Native Americans to the federal 
government); 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1790).   
166 DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 33 (West 
Publishing, 1979) (citing ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX)(alteration in original).   
167 Id.  
168 U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 3. (emphasis added).  
169 Getches, supra note 166, at 33; Wood, supra note 164, at 122-23.   
170 See id. Though the trust relationship is a function of judicial decree, the 
exclusion of states from tribal relations provides a textual basis for the Marshall decisions 
(discussed below).   
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In the early federal period, Congress constructed the basis for 
federal Indian relations through laws designed “to regulate trade and 
intercourse with the Indian tribes, and to preserve peace on the 
frontier.”171  These laws, commonly known as the Non Intercourse 
Acts, were formulated to realize a number of goals, articulated by 
Francis Paul Prucha as: (1) allocating the power to manage Indian 
affairs between states and the federal government, (2) extinguishing, 
in an organized manner, Native American title in order to expand 
white settlements, (3) restraining non-government entities and 
“frontiersman” from invading territory still claimed by Indians, and (4) 
“fulfilling the responsibility that the Christian whites had to aid the 
savage pagans along the path toward civilization.”172  In sum, the 
laws were designed to eradicate Indian ownership of land without 
igniting a violent backlash. 173 
 
1.  The Origins of the Trade and Intercourse Act 
 
The first Native American Trade and Intercourse Act was 
passed in 1790two years after the State of New York negotiated its 
first treaty with the Onondaga.174  The Act was a necessary means 
to suppress foreseeable conflict between white settlers and Native 
American tribes.175   Even before 1790, the federal government had 
set explicit boundaries for Indian Country by excluding white settlers 
from entering the area, and denying the right of private individuals or 
local governments to acquire land from the Indians.176   
 The architect of this policy, then president George Washington, 
envisioned peace with native tribes through organized, steady 
occupation rather than exercises of conquest.177   As such, upon 
hearing disturbing accounts of violence on the American frontier, 
Washington urged Congress to pass legislation placing a sharp 
boundary between white settlers and Native American tribes.178  
 After six enactments, the Trade and Intercourse Act reads, in 
pertinent part:  
 
171 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS:
INDIAN TRADE AND INTERCOURSE ACTS, 1790-1834 2 (Harvard University Press 1962).     
172 Id. at 1-2.  
173 Id. at 3.  
174 Id. (The final, most lasting Act was passed in 1834).  
175 Id.  
176 See id. at 45-49.   
177 Prucha, supra note 171, 45.   
178 See id. at 45-49.   
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No purchase, grant, lease or other conveyance of land, or of 
 any title or  claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, 
shall be of  any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty 
or  conveyance entered into pursuant to the Constitution.179 
 
As Prucha points out, the Act only indirectly affects Native American 
tribes by limiting them in their ability to trade and sell land.180  It 
does not, in and of itself, provide any sort of protection by the federal 
government.181 Rather, the Act merely conforms to the political 
agenda of the early federal period: defining the relationship between 
the federal government and the states.182  By granting the federal 
government the sole right to purchase and acquire Native American 
lands, the Act forecloses states from dealing directly with Indian 
tribes. 183  
 
2.  Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida 
 
In County of Oneida v. Oneida Nation of New York, the Oneida 
Naton, also a member of the Haudenosaunee confederacy, sought 
monetary damages for the use and occupancy of lands acquired by 
the State of New York in 1795.184   The case is remarkably similar to 
the Onondaga case:  the complaint alleged that “from time 
immemorial to shortly after the Revolution, the Oneidas inhabited 
what is now central New York State.”185   From 1795 to 1846, 
twenty-five treaties were executed between the State and the Oneida 
Nation.186  Of these, “[o]nly two . . . were conducted under federal 
supervision, as required by the Non Intercourse Act.”187   By 1846, 
the Oneida’s land had diminished from nearly six million acres to 
only a few hundred acres.188 
 
179 25 U.S.C. §177.   
180 Prucha, supra note 171, at 48.   
181 See id.  
182 See id.  
183 See id. 
184 470 U.S. 226, 229-30 (1985).   
185 Id. at 230.   
186 Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 434 F..Supp. 517, 535(1977), aff’d 
County of Oneida v. Oneida Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985).   
187 Id.  
188 Id.  
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In assessing whether the conveyance comported with the 
requirements of the Non Intercourse Act, the district court listed four 
elements needed by Native American plaintiffs to establish a prima 
facie case. 189 The plaintiff(s) must show that:  
 
(1) it is or represents an Indian “tribe” within the meaning of  the Act;  
 (2) the parcels of land at issue herein are covered by the Act as 
 tribal land;  
 (3) the United States has never consented to the alienation  of 
 the tribal land;  
 (4) the trust relationship between the United States and the  tribe, 
 which is established by coverage of the Act, has never been ter
minated or abandoned.190 
 
The first element was easily met because the Oneida, like the 
Onondaga, is a tribe recognized by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.191     
Since the six-million-acre territory within the boundaries of New York 
State was part of the Oneida’s original land, the court confirmed that 
the second element was also fulfilled.192  The State failed to 
produce any evidence of a subsequent treaty by Congress ratifying 
or consenting to the transaction, so the court established that the 
third element was met.193  Finally, the court found no explicit 
congressional termination of the trust relationship between the 
Oneida Nation and the United States government.194 
 
C.   The Evolution of the Trust Relationship at Common 
Law  
 
189 Id.. at 537.   
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 538; Complaint, supra note 1, at 2-3 (“[The Onondaga] has been at all 
relevant times, an “Indian nation” within the meaning of the federal Indian Trade and 
Intercourse Acts of 1790 and later, now 25 U.S.C. § 177.)   The responsibilities of the BIA 
are discussed in note 155 above.    
192 Oneida Nation, 434 F.Supp. at 538.  The court cites an earlier Oneida case, 
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666-69 (1974), in which the 
Supreme Court held that Indian title in their aboriginal land is entitled to federal 
protection. 
193 Id. at 538.   Under the Trade and Intercourse Act, any treaty conveying land to 
from a tribe to a state must be ratified by Congress.  See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1790).   
194 Id. at 538.  In Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d. 
370 (1975), the First Circuit ruled that “any withdrawal of trust obligations by Congress 
would have to have been ‘plain and unambiguous’ to be effective.” Id. at 380.   
Accordingly, the Onondaga complaint asserts that “[t]he relationship of the Onondaga 
Nation to the United States has never been terminated.” Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.   
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Though some form of a fiduciary duty may have been implicit in 
the Constitution and the Trade and Intercourse Acts, the trust 
relationship primarily grew out of common law decision-making.195  
An expansive body of case law has defined the modern trust 
relationship, as federal courts play a key role in demarcating 
relationships among the federal government, state governments, 
tribes, and individuals. 196   
1.  The Marshall Trilogy 
 
The Marshall Trilogyconsisting of Johnson v. M’Intosh,
Cherokee v. State of Georgia, and Worchester v. State of 
Georgiamarks the early development of the trust relationship.197 
There, Marshall set forth a direct conceptual approach the legal 
status Native American tribes.198  The three decisions collectively 
establish the core principles of inherent, residual sovereignty and the 
fiduciary duty:   
 
(1)[B]y virtue of aboriginal, political, and territorial status,  Indian 
 tribes possessed certain incidents of preexisting sovereignty;  
 (2) this sovereignty was subject to diminution or elimination by the 
 United States, but not by the individual states; 
(3) the tribes’ limited inherent sovereignty and their corresponding 
 dependency upon the United States for protection imposed on 
the latter a trust responsibility.199 
 
As such, the common-law fiduciary duty derives from a tension 
inherent in all aspects of Native American law“between the 
sovereign status of tribes existing as of the time of Euro-American 
settlement and the. . . imposition of a new and ultimately dominant 
government resulting from that settlement . . . .”200   
 
195 See id.  
196 See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980); Seminole 
Nation v. U.S., 316 U.S. 286 (1942); Worchester v. Ga., 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); 
Cherokee Nation v. Ga., 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Joint Tribal Council of 
Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1975). 
197 See Worchester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 518; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1; 
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).  This section will refer to the 
relationship envisioned by Marshall as a “trust,” though, as discussed later on, the 
Marshall Trilogy construed a ward/guardian, rather than trust, relationship.   
198 Conference of Western Attorneys General (CWAG), American Indian Law 
Deskbook 5 (Clay Smith ed. University Press of Colorado 2004).   
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 6.  
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In Johnson v. M’Intosh, Chief Justice John Marshall held that a 
conveyance of native land to a private individual by tribal chiefs was 
invalid.201 In referring to the doctrine of discovery,202 Marshall 
stated that, although Native American tribes held a right to occupy 
the land, alienable or legal title ultimately rested in the hands of the 
federal government.203  The federal government gained this right 
through the conquest of inhabited country and the subsequent 
formation of Euro-American societies upon Native American soil204 
Therefore, only the United States could extinguish aboriginal title 
through continued conquest or purchase.205  
Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia206 and Worchester v. State 
of Georgia207 serve to clarify the holding in Johnson by affirming the 
distinct, yet subjugated, status of Native American tribes.208     In 
Cherokee, Marshall first defined the legal status of Native Americans 
as “domestic dependant nations” whose “relation to the United States 
resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”209  Marshall expanded 
upon this guardianship principle in Worchester, where he 
characterized the Cherokee Nation as “a distinct community” in 
which Georgia laws are inapplicable.210  In both decisions Marshall 
set forth our understanding of Native American sovereignty:  Native 
American tribes are sovereign entities vis a vis the states, but 
conquered and dependent entities in relation to the federal 
government.211  In doing so, Marshall envisioned a ward/guardian 
 
201 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 602.   
202 Id. at 573.  As Marshall states, “The exclusion of all other Europeans, 
necessarily gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil 
from the natives, and establishing settlements on it.” Id.  
203 Id. at 591.  
204 Id.  
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of inhabited 
 country into conquest may appear, if the principle has been asserted 
in the first   instance, and afterwards sustained, if a country has been 
acquired and held un  der it; if the property of the great mass of the 
community originates in it, it   becomes the law of the land, and cannot 
be questioned.  Id. 
The “principle” which Marshall referred to appears to be Locke’s labor justification.  
See supra text accompanying notes 111 -117.  
205 Id. at 587. 
206 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).   
207 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).  
208 Tully, supra note 105, at 175.   
209 Cherokee, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16.   
210 Id. at 560.  
211 See id. at 560-61.  The Native American right to self-government is subject to 
diminution by positive enactments by the federal government, not the states.   
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relationship between the federal government and 
tribespropounding a view that the federal government must protect 
uncivilized and vulnerable Native American tribes from the states.212  
 
2.   The Canons of Construction 
 
In light of the guardianship imposed between the federal 
government and Indian tribes under the Marshall Trilogy, courts have 
developed specific canons of construction used to interpret treaties 
negotiated between tribes and the federal government.213  Three 
interpretive principles, designed to rectify bargaining inequality 
between the government and Indian tribes, are:  “[1] ambiguous 
expressions must be resolved in favor of the Indian parties 
concerned; [2] Indian treaties must be interpreted as the Indians 
themselves would have understood them; and [3] Indian treaties 
must be liberally construed in favor of the Indians.”214  In most 
instances, testimony is taken from tribal members, historians, and 
anthropologists familiar with circumstances which may have existed 
during the time the treaties were negotiated.215   
 Though the canons afford some protection to Native American 
interests, their scope is limited to tribal dealings with the federal 
government.216  Therefore, in the case of the Onondaga,  the issue 
remains whether the canons of construction can be extended to 
apply to, and thereby nullify, treaties made between states and 
Native American tribes.217  This determination turns on the extent of 
the federal government’s fiduciary duty to protect tribes against 
illegal and intrusive treaty-making by the states.218   
3.   Montana v. United States  
 
Since the Marshall Trilogy, the trust relationship has experienced 
little expansion beyond the protection of commercial interests,  such 
 
212 See id. at 560.   The ward-guardian advanced by Marshall should be 
distinguished from the trustee-beneficiary relationship, which is far less paternalistic.   
Courts in recent years have advanced the latter view with respect to the relationship 
between the federal government and Tribes.  This issue will discussed at greater length 
in Part IV.   
213 Getches, supra note 166, at 200.   
214 Id. at 35.  
215 Id. at 36.   
216 See CWAG, supra note 198, at 17.  
217 See id.  
218 See id.  
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as gaming, and an extraconstitutional status to maintain control over 
internal affairs.219  The narrow construction of the trust relationship 
was exemplified in Montana v. United States, a 1981 case where the 
Crow Tribe attempted to prohibit non-members from hunting and 
fishing on fee lands.220    
 In Montana, the Supreme Court introduced the general principle 
that the “exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect 
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent 
with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive 
without express congressional delegation.”221   The Court once 
again affirmed that, through conquest, Native Americans had 
divested control over their “external” relations with non-Indians.222  
In doing so, the Court rejected the Crow’s sovereignty to proscribe 
hunting and fishing on fee land held by non-Indians.223   
 Montana does, however, provide some benefit to the 
Onondaga’s claim for declaratory judgment.224   The second 
exception to the Montana rule states that a tribe may “retain inherent 
power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on 
fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has 
some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or 
the health and welfare of the tribe.”225  After asserting its claim to 
fee title through a declaratory judgment, the Onondaga may 
establish that hazardous environmental conditions caused by private 
property owners threatens its political existence.226   If successfully 
argued, the Montana exception would allow the Onondaga to 
exercise civil regulatory authority over its land.227 
 
219 See id. at 6.  
220 450 U.S. at 544, 566 (1981).   Following a late-nineteenth century congressional 
policy of allotting reservation lands to individual tribal members, Indian allottees received 
fee patents and subsequently transferred property to non-members of the tribe.   
Because there was no actual “diminishment” of Indian lands, these allotments remained 
part of the reservation.  They are subject to federal rather than state control under 18 
U.S.C. § 1151.   CWAG, supra note 198, at 71-2.   
221 Id. at 564 (referring to the residual, limited sovereignty discussed throughout this 
section)(emphasis added).   
222 See id.   
223 Id. at 566.  
224 See id.  
225 Id. (emphasis added) The first exception, inapplicable in the Onondaga case, 
allows tribes to exercise civil authority over nonmembers “who enter consensual 
relationships with the tribe or its members, though commercial dealing, contracts, leases, 
or other arrangements. Id. at 565.  
226 See id.  
227 See id.  
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IV.  Establishing Title Using the Trust Relationship:  Cultural Interests 
as an Element of Self-Government 
 
Though the trust relationship purports to respect the sovereignty 
of Native American societies, its limitations impose serious obstacles 
in the fair adjudication of land disputes.228   As the discussion above 
indicates, the fiduciary duty currently obligates the federal 
government to protect the right of self-government, viewed as strictly 
political in nature.229  However, our courts have thus far failed to 
recognize that Native American self-government, in order to survive, 
must reestablish spiritual connections to aboriginal land.230    In the 
case of the Onondaga, this connection has been tarnished by years 
of environmental degradation by Honeywell, Clark, and Trigen.231   
 This section suggests that the strength of the Onondaga claim 
lies within the common law trust doctrine, rather than the federal 
Trade and Intercourse Act.232 The Onondaga Nation has the 
opportunity to enforce the trust relationship to protect culturally and 
spiritually significant lands from state and private intrusion.  After 
focusing on true intentions of the Onondaga regarding the five 
treaties at issue in their litigation, the analysis below emphasizes the 
political disruption caused by the treaties and the subsequent 
obligations of the federal government.   
 
A.  The Onondaga’s True Intent 
 
The Onondaga must initially establish a lack of mutual assent 
and fairness in their negotiations with the State.  The Nation can use 
the visual representation of the wampum, as well as the textual 
constitutional basis of Gayanashogowa, to assert the Onondaga’s 
intention to preserve its system of government.   The Onondaga 
must then emphasize that, under Gayanashogowa, maintaining 
political sovereignty as an independent nation and member of the 
Haudenosaunee required retaining ownership and control over 
aboriginal land.   
 
1.   The Onondaga’s Status as a “Domestic Dependant Nation”   
 
228 See supra text accompanying notes 184-94.   
229 See supra text accompanying notes 105-10.   
230 See The Haudenosaunee Confederacy, supra note 125, at 4.  
231 See Complaint, supra note 1, at 1-2.   
232 See supra text accompanying notes 147-53.  
2006] Gayanashogowa and Guardianship: Expanding and Clarifying the Federal-
Tribal Trust Relationship  31 
 
Chief Justice John Marshall defined the federal government’s 
role as “protecting” Native American tribes against intrusions by 
states and private entities.233   Though this formulation is popularly 
characterized as a “trust” relationship, it more closely resembles a 
guardianship or paternalistic bond.234  The distinction at first seems 
narrow, but it is in fact a critical shortcoming in our legal analysis of 
Native American land claims.235   The approach taken by Marshall, 
and followed in subsequent decisions, perpetuates the Lockean 
misconception that Native American societies like the Onondaga 
were weak and underdeveloped prior to European arrival.236   
 As described in Part II, the Onondaga, in the tradition of the 
Haudenosaunee Confederacy, visually recorded dealings using 
wampum beads.237   Belts constructed using wampum connote a 
tribe’s true understanding of each interactionan understanding of 
equal affiliation, peace, and friendship.238   The parallel beads 
signifying “two paths or two vessels traveling down the same rivers 
together” seem to indicate a perception much different from the 
ward/guardian relationship envisioned by Justice Marshall.239    
Regardless of whether they dealt with states, individuals, or directly 
with the federal government, the Onondaga apparently viewed 
themselves as the ultimate keepers of the land rather than a 
“domestic dependant nation.”240   
 
2.  Transferring Alienable Title 
 
Locke’s foundational belief that property ownership stems from 
commercial production sharply contradicts the Haudenosaunee 
conception that property should be held, in its natural state, for the 
 
233 CWAG, supra note 198, at 6 (describing tribes as “extraconstitutional political 
bodies”).    
234 See Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831) (“[T]heir 
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.  They look to our 
government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to 
their wants; and address the President as their great father.”)  
235 See id.  
236 See supra text accompanying notes 105-10.   Marshall’s words, cited in footnote 
204, suggest that, although he believed Native American societies had some form of 
government, it was insignificant in comparison to that of the “conqueror.” Johnson, 21 
U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591.   
237 Tully, supra note 105, at 177.   
238 Id.  
239 See Haudenosaunee Confederacy, supra note 148.   
240 Cherokee, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16.  
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“seventh generation.”241  Gayanashogowa, in its written form, states 
that a visiting nation, using Haudenosaunee land, must never 
interfere with a tribe’s relationship to the land.242   These words 
indicate that the Onondaga perceived its treaties with the State of 
New York as invitations of co-use, contingent on the visiting parties’ 
acceptance of its system of government and way of life.243  The 
relationship  between the original five nations of the Haudenosaunee 
and the Tuscarora Nation, which joined the Confederacy in 1712, 
exemplifies this  principle.244 Given the Onondaga’s deeply 
embedded belief that land should be preserved, its seems unlikely 
that the Nation would contemplate permanently transferring large 
portions of  their territory.245   
 Another key piece of evidence establishing the Onondaga’s lack 
of intent to transfer title was their strong reliance on land for self-
government.246 The text of Gayanashogowa suggests that the 
Haudenosaunee’s political system was synonymous with its cultural 
and spiritual ties to land.247   Gayanashogowa’s significance stems 
from the land it was founded upon.248   The land and all of its 
physical characteristics was an integral part of each individual 
nation’s identity,  a notion which survived even the formation of the 
Confederacy itself.249    References to living inhabitants and 
resources establish that political strength was derived from natural 
surroundings.250  Accordingly, control over land corresponded to 
political power, the power of chiefs as trustees and women as the 
ultimate holders of title.251   
 
B.  Extending and Enforcing the Trust Relationship 
As stated in Part I, the Onondaga’s claim to nearly two million 
acres of land under the Trade and Intercourse Act is contingent on 
the federal district court’s adherence to a New York real property 
 
241 See Tully, supra note 105, at 153.   
242 The Constitution of the Five Nations, supra note 122, at 51.  
243 See supra text accompanying note 141.  
244 See Haudenosaunee Confederacy, supra note 125.  
245 See id.  
246 See supra text accompanying notes 132-35.  
247 See Haudenosaunee, supra note 125.  
248 See id.  
249 See Haudenosaunee, supra note 148.  
250 Haudenosaunee Confederacy, supra note 125.   
251 See supra text accompanying note 134.  
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recording statute.252  Though the 1788 treaty which transferred 
most of the Onondaga’s land was recorded after the passing of the 
1790 Trade and Intercourse Act, it was negotiated in 1788 and 
purportedly reaffirmed a month prior to the Act’s enactment.253  In 
the event the Court determines that the 1788 treaty does not fall 
within the scope of the Trade and Intercourse Act, the Onondaga 
must construct an alternative common law argument in support of 
their land claim.254  This alternative presents a rare opportunity to 
clarify and enforce the federal government’s fiduciary duty .   
 
1.  Use of the Canons of Construction for State/Tribal Treaties 
 
Under the canons of construction, treaties which do not clearly 
represent the tribe’s true intent and understanding at the time of 
signing are construed as void.255  As discussed in Part III, the 
canons currently apply to Native American treaties with the 
Executive Branch and Congress.256  However, as a fiduciary, the 
federal government is arguably under an obligation to ensure that all 
treaties executed by the states comport with the same common law 
contractual requirement of mutual assent.257  The federal 
government’s acquiescence to the treaties made by the State of New 
York impose a responsibility on the federal government to ensure 
that these treaties were fairly executed.258 As established above, 
the Onondaga did not intend to convey title to its land under the 
treaties.259  Therefore, the canons of construction, though loosely 
defined, provide a basis for enforcing the fiduciary duty and thereby 
nullifying the 1788 treaty.   
 
2.  An Expansion of “Political” Protection: From Guardianship to 
Gayanashogowa 
In addition to using the canons of construction as a basis for 
nullifying the 1788 treaty, the Nation can assert that the treaty 
violated its inherent, residual sovereignty.   Under the current 
 
252 See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.   
253 See Post Standard, supra note 42.   
254 See id. 
255 See Getches, supra note 166, at 200.   
256 See CWAG, supra note 198, at 17.   
257 See supra text accompanying notes 197-212.  
258 See id.  
259 See Haudenosaunee Confederacy, supra note 125.   
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common law construction of the trust relationship, the federal 
government’s fiduciary duty rests on protecting the political, rather 
than cultural, sovereignty of tribes from the intrusion of states and 
private parties.260  For that reason, a pressing concern in the 
Onondaga case is whether the trust relationship can be enforced to 
remedy environmental harms to culturally significant Native American 
lands.261 The background discussed in this Note suggests that, in 
order to trigger the federal government’s fiduciary duty, the cultural 
harm inflicted on the Onondaga Nation must be characterized as an 
infringement upon its right of tribal self-government.262   
 Since the common law fiduciary duty is intended to protect 
Native American sovereignty in relation to the states, the Onondaga 
must argue that their system of tribal government, Gayanashogowa,
is coexistent with their deep cultural affiliation with their land.263    
Accordingly, the environmental degradation caused by private parties 
and, indirectly, the State, constitutes a violation of the Onondaga’s 
inherent, residual sovereignty.264   
 If successfully asserted, an established imposition on tribal self-
government obligates the federal government to intervene as a 
fiduciaryprotecting the tribe’s political integrity against the State 
and private parties.265  In an identical or intervening action, the 
federal government’s argument would inevitably assert that the 
established, constitutional basis of Gayanashogowaa political 
system which predates European arrival on this continenttrumps 
state and private fee ownership of Onondaga territory.266  By 
making this argument on the Onondaga’s behalf, the federal 
government would acknowledge that the land at issue was governed 
by a sophisticated, mature, and developed society.267     
 
3.  The Remedy:  Using Declaratory Judgment to Force 
Environmental Rehabilitation 
 
260 See supra text accompanying note 211.  
261 See id. 
262 See id.  
263 See Lepsch, supra note 158, at 8-9 (stating that the trust doctrine is a shield “to 
protect tribes from the ever-encroaching fangs of the states.”) 
264 See id.  
265 See id.  
266 See supra text accompanying notes 139-49.   
267 See id.  
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Equating self-government with the environmental wellbeing of 
aboriginal lands raises a subsequent common law option.268  The 
Onondaga have stated that they do not intend to physically reoccupy 
their aboriginal land.269  Rather, they aim to secure some power 
over the cleanup of sacred areas such as Onondaga Lake.270  
Accordingly, under Montana v. United States, the Onondaga have 
the option of  arguing that the conduct of the non-Indian entities, 
such as the State and the named corporate defendants, threatens 
the political integrity of the tribe.271   Thus, having established fee 
title, the Onondaga fit squarely into the second exception presented 
by the Supreme Court in Montana.272    This argument would allow 
the Onondaga to exercise civil authority over the cleanup of 
Onondaga Lake and other culturally significant areas.273   
 Alternatively, the Onondaga may once again hold the federal 
government, as a fiduciary, responsible for ensuring that the land is 
brought back to its natural state. As long as environmental 
degradation infringes upon Onondaga self-government, the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs is under a duty to adhere to the Onondaga Nation’s 
standard for environmental restoration.    
 
CONCLUSION 
The Onondaga Nation’s land claim raises a novel challenge in 
the area of federal-tribal and tribal-state relations.   The fiduciary 
duty, though intended to serve as a “shield” against state intrusion, is 
fairly limited in scope.  This Note suggests that any limitation can be 
overcome through the use of historical evidence indicating a 
correlation between culturally significant lands and tribal self-
government.   Such evidence would not only expose the level of 
harm suffered by tribes like the Onondaga, but would also highlight 
the absence of mutual asset in land treaties executed by states and 
private parties.    Since f deral power over Native American affairs imposes a 
duty upon the Executive Branch to protect residual, inherent tribal 
sovereignty, it is imperative for tribes to characterize cultural ties to 
land as creating unique political rights.   As the Onondaga Nation 
declares in its complaint, its relationship with the land extends 
 
268 See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981). 
269 Complaint, supra note 1, at 7.
270 See id. at 6-7.  
271 See Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.   
272 See id.  
273 See id.  
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beyond “ownership” or “possession.”   Therefore, it is in the Nation’s 
best interests to articulate the cultural and political injustice caused 
by the dispossession and environmental degradation of its territory.     
 
